The first four BRAC criteria comprise the tenets of military value. It is clear that the Navy and DoD recognized the irreplaceable military value of Brunswick Naval Air Station. In the BRAC Commission's first hearing with the Navy on May 18th, when questioned about the economics of realignment, the Chief of Naval Operations responded by saying, quote, "This is a military value question more than anything else, and a naval base and the air base in the Northeast. We''re keeping SERE training up there, but we''re really keeping a strategic capability in the Northeast. That''s what it boils down to." The military value of Brunswick has not diminished since May 18th. DoD's first BRAC criterion focuses on current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force. This includes the impact on joint warfighting, training and readiness. Brunswick is the only fully capable operational DoD airfield remaining north of New Jersey. Previous BRAC rounds closed all other active duty air bases in the Northeast, as this slide demonstrates. Brunswick is strategically located adjacent to the great circle routes for ships and aircraft crossing the North Atlantic. This location makes Brunswick a vital link in our national defense posture and critical for surveillance of ships coming from Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. Indeed, its proximity to major population centers, combined with its ability to support every aircraft in the DoD inventory, makes BNAS essential across the full range of homeland defense operations and contingencies. Brunswick's unique location provides it with correspondingly unique capabilities for current and future operations in the defense of our homeland. Brunswick was a key base for homeland defense during the months following September 11th, providing P-3 surveillance missions under Operation Vigilant Shield, and land-based combat air patrol for Navy ships at sea. And only Brunswick Naval Air Station can perform such missions efficiently in the future. Maritime patrol assets from Brunswick will continue to be needed to locate and monitor ships in the North Atlantic, including those potentially carrying weapons of mass destruction, cruise missiles, or other threats to our shores. Maritime Domain Awareness is a key component of homeland defense. Properly based Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft, or "MPRA," is essential to this increasingly important mission. As Rear Admiral Rich has pointed out, response time and endurance on-station are critical in MPRA operations, and the location of a maritime patrol aircraft base is critical to those capabilities. The removal of full-time, operationally ready maritime patrol assets from the northeast is contrary to the very concept of Maritime Domain Awareness and would leave our nation vulnerable. Removal of these aircraft would degrade readiness by requiring detachments from Jacksonville, Florida, to perform missions that can be performed much more efficiently and effectively from Brunswick. It is a move that would increase the risk of failure in the defense of our homeland, a mission in which even a single failure could be catastrophic. A review of the Navy's analysis group minutes proves that the strategic location of Brunswick was confirmed by warfighting commands no fewer than ten separate times during the deliberations. The Commanders of Fleet Forces and Northern Command repeatedly voiced grave concerns to the Navy about the potential loss of Brunswick to their warfighting readiness. These commanders also said that the closure of Brunswick would damage the Navy's ability to support Northern Command's homeland defense missions. Removal of Brunswick's air assets would have the same negative effects on this mission as would closure. The minutes show that the military value of individual facilities was determined early in the BRAC review process. In August 2004, the Navy's infrastructure team presented the Navy analysis group with a list of 33 airfields that should be assigned military value scores for strategic location. Brunswick Naval Air Station was on that list. Yet, the Navy determined that only two airfields would receive scores for strategic location. The fact that Brunswick was not given any credit for its strategic location after two commanders weighed in no fewer than ten times about the strategic value of Brunswick's location is inexplicable. The minutes of a January 2005 Navy analysis group meeting show that discussions were held on whether a scenario to close Brunswick was desirable, quote, "in light of the fact that Brunswick is the last active-duty DoD air base in New England and is relatively un-encroached, the significant capital investment in facilities there, the requirement for a homeland defense capability in this region, and the loss of East Coast aviation capability this scenario would represent." Despite these concerns and those of our operational commanders, the Navy still forwarded to the Infrastructure Executive Council a recommendation to close Brunswick. As far as we can determine from a review of the minutes, the overriding factor that led the Navy to ignore the many advantages of Brunswick was a goal to locate maritime patrol aircraft at a single site on the East Coast. Yet, the Commander of Fleet Forces warned that: "Closure of NAS Brunswick supports operational synergies associated with a single-site P-3/MMA force at the unacceptable expense of closing a base offering numerous transformational and maritime Homeland Defense basing opportunities." The IEC subsequently rejected the recommendation to close Brunswick because, and I quote again, "Department of Navy leadership expressed concern that closure of NAS Brunswick could have strategic implications regarding Northern Command's homeland defense strategy and would result in the loss of the only Naval aviation footprint in New England." Commissioners, this statement recognizes that Brunswick is not just a training site or staging area. It is an operational airfield in the defense of our nation. The Navy's recommendation to close Brunswick was overturned by the Council due to the base's overwhelming strategic military value. This determination should have triggered the reconsideration of single-siting maritime patrol forces on the East Coast. Yet, we can find no evidence that this occurred. The first measure of military value – the impact on mission capabilities and operational readiness – was ignored. The second BRAC criterion measures military value by considering the availability and condition of a base's land, facilities, and associated airspace. This is what the Navy's Infrastructure Analysis Team stated on January 11, 2005, concerning the infrastructure at Brunswick: • "BNAS, the last active duty DoD airfield in New England, is available 24/7, 365 days per year, and offers unique Joint and NATO strategic, physical, and training assets. • BNAS is strategically located to base maritime homeland defense missions. • Of note, BNAS has no encroachment issues, nearly 1,000 acres available for expansion, 63,000 square miles of unencumbered training airspace, and nearly 12,000 Navy-owned mountainous acres capable of accommodating joint exercises and meeting all Navy and Marine Corps Atlantic Fleet SERE training requirements at a single site. • Armed aircraft can depart BNAS and enter offshore operating areas without over-flying populated areas." Brunswick Naval Air Station is in first-class condition, with more than $120 million in recapitalization and military construction during the past five years. As a result of this investment, DoD has, in effect, an all-new airfield at Brunswick. With its side-by-side 8,000-foot runways, there are literally no aircraft in the DoD''s current or future inventory that Brunswick cannot support either in a transient role or permanent assignment. Other investments included: (show slide) • Hangar 6 - Six Bays • Runway Recapitalization • Ramp & Taxiway Repairs • Aircraft Control Tower • Family Housing, Phases I, II & III • Transient Quarters • Relocated Base Entrance NATO has recognized the importance of Brunswick to its operational capability, and backed up that recognition with significant investment in the base's facilities. The station's NATO-built fuel farm regularly supports all types of foreign aircraft. Its state-of-the-art Tactical Support Center, also NATO-funded, provides vital command and control for operational and exercise flights by U.S. and NATO maritime patrol aircraft. Of great significance, as has been mentioned, is the fact that Brunswick has the only hangar capable of hosting the MMA aircraft, which is scheduled to replace the P-3 starting in 2012. This hangar was specifically designed to support the MMA and its related unmanned aerial vehicles. The recommendation to realign Brunswick significantly deviated from BRAC criterion two by inadequately considering the value of this brand-new infrastructure. Under realignment, additional MMA-capable hangars would need to be built from scratch in Jacksonville. Rather than reduce excess capacity, this realignment would increase it and require significant military construction costs. As home to the four active duty squadrons, Brunswick provides basing and support essential to the entire Maritime Patrol Aircraft force under the Navy's new Fleet Response and Flexible Deployment concept. This concept increases the proportion of MPRA aircraft and crews at bases in the United States, and requires them to maintain a high state of readiness for immediate surge deployments overseas. The Station's simulator capacity is essential to meet the training needs of the fleet's P-3 crews. I would note that the simulators at Jacksonville are already at maximum utilization now. Brunswick's facilities, unencumbered airspace, and location at the nearest point in the United States to Europe and the Middle East provide the capabilities to support the Fleet Response concept. The conditions of criterion two are fully met by Brunswick Naval Air Station, but not properly recognized by either a realignment or a closure scenario! The third BRAC criterion is the ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization and future force requirements. Brunswick's role during Operation Iraqi Freedom clearly demonstrates its ability to accommodate mobilization and surge requirements. Brunswick is the preferred refueling stop for tactical jet and turboprop aircraft crossing the Atlantic Ocean. The base hosted or provided logistical support for more than 120 aircraft returning from Middle East operations. Brunswick also provided berthing for more than 850 DoD personnel returning from Iraq to the U.S. through Brunswick. The base's ramp space is sufficient to park more than 250 maritime patrol or other large aircraft under maximum surge conditions. Additionally, as the northeasternmost base in the United States, Brunswick supports mobilization efforts every day. Naval Air Station Brunswick is the closest U.S military airfield to the current theater of operations. Despite all the talk of transformation and jointness during this BRAC round, it is remarkable that the Navy did not ask in even one data call whether Brunswick could expand its current missions to more fully utilize the Air Station's capacity. The only gaining scenarios run were for aviation assets from reserve air bases before Brunswick was considered for closure. This option was not even revisited after the final decision was made to realign, rather than close, Brunswick. Clearly, the Navy and the OSD missed a tremendous opportunity to strengthen U.S. military capabilities by not placing other operational forces at Brunswick to fulfill current and future total force requirements that meet contingency, mobilization, surge operations, and training missions. A realignment to a Naval Air Facility or complete closure of NAS Brunswick eviscerates the military value of Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance assets by removing them from a superb facility in a critical theater of operations. It would require future detachments – from one U.S. base to another – to meet mission requirements. The removal of Brunswick's aircraft would significantly and dangerously degrade operational readiness. It would increase response time in emergencies. This proposed realignment would not meet the needs of Northern Command's homeland defense missions. It would result in a Navy and a Department of Defense that will operate less effectively and efficiently, and with many hidden costs. Taken together, the first three criteria I have discussed are a measure of the most crucial elements of military value, now and in the future. By any fair and complete assessment, Brunswick Naval Air Station measures up. It must remain fully operational.