WASHINGTON, DC-- Homeland Security Committee Chairman Susan Collins has released a letter responding to Ranking Member Joseph Lieberman’s request that the Committee issue a subpoena to allow committee staff to depose the President’s personal staff to include White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card and Assistant to the President for Homeland Security Frances Townsend, and to compel the production of additional documents relating to personnel of the Executive Office of the President and the Office of the Vice President.
To date, the committee has held 21 hearings, obtained over 820,000 pages of documents, including more than 17,000 documents from the White House, has heard testimony from 80 witnesses, and conducted recorded interviews of more than 325 individuals.
In her letter to Senator Lieberman, Senator Collins noted out that the Committee investigators have been adamant in their pursuit of documents relevant to the investigation, and that in cases where there was agreement that agencies have not been cooperative, such as the case with the Department of Justice, subpoenas were issued.
Full text of the letter is as follows:
March 15, 2006
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
604 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510
Dear Joe:
I am writing in response to the letter you sent me today on our investigation of Hurricane Katrina. It has been a pleasure working closely with you over the past six months to examine closely the preparations for and response to this catastrophic event. From our two trips to the Gulf region, to our twenty-one Committee hearings and countless meetings with state, local, and federal officials, to our current, decidedly bipartisan effort to produce a final report that does justice to our undertaking, I am proud of our thorough investigation.
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- Lieberman letter, 2 –
This has been an extraordinary undertaking. Together with our staffs, we have received and analyzed 820,000 pages of documents, formally interviewed more than 325 people, and received hearing testimony from 80 witnesses. I think it is fair to say that our investigation has been the most comprehensive of the Katrina reviews, each of which has been useful in advancing the public’s understanding.
In your letter of today, you ask that the Committee issue subpoenas to the White House to compel the depositions of members of the President’s personal staff and the production of additional documents relating to personnel of the Executive Office of the President and the Office of the Vice President. In my judgment, such subpoenas are neither warranted nor appropriate.
Such a request raises the important issue of the extent to which our efforts could hinder the ability of this President – and future Presidents – to receive the candid advice that he needs to perform his constitutional duties. It appears that much of what you ask the Committee to subpoena would be covered by executive privilege. Therefore, I do not believe that it is in the Committee’s interest to subpoena the White House simply for the purpose of securing such an assertion.
Together, we have been relentless in our efforts to secure the information we need to ensure that our investigation is thorough and comprehensive. I believe we have succeeded. On October 7, 2005, you and I sent extensive requests for documents and information to the White House and the Office of the Vice President. On January 12, 2006, we sent another letter to the White House prioritizing our requests and demanding more documents and information. Throughout the process, we have been in direct communications with the White House to secure the documents and information that we required. When problems arose, I took the lead in calling Cabinet secretaries and White House officials to secure their cooperation.
We have been similarly adamant in our pursuit of documents and information from federal departments and agencies. The Department of Homeland Security alone has produced more than 350,000 pages of documents and made available 73 witnesses for interviews.
Moreover, when one federal entity refused to make key witnesses available for interviews, I issued five subpoenas for Department of Justice personnel, who were promptly interviewed by Committee staff.
As a result of our efforts, we have a clear window into the functioning and role of the White House in the days before and after Hurricane Katrina made landfall.
The Executive Office of the President has produced more than 17,000 pages of documents. These documents include memos, policy analyses, and emails with electronic attachments sent to individuals in the White House. The Committee also has received transcripts of the FEMA-hosted video teleconferences, including those in which the President or other White House officials participated. Collectively, these documents show us the information that the White House was receiving from various agencies before landfall and during the response phase. The production contains documents relating to the White House Task Force Katrina and includes lists of individuals attending White House-organized meetings and summaries of agency efforts. Also produced were documents that include information provided to the most senior officials within the White House during the critical period.
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- LIEBERMAN LETTER, 3 -
In addition to the documents, the White House has provided two extensive briefings on its role in the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina, and a third briefing on the White House “Lessons Learned” report. All three briefings were presented by Ken Rapuano, the Deputy Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, who was deeply involved in the response to Hurricane Katrina at the White House. These briefings, which we both agreed were very useful, included significant question and answer sessions where Committee staff had the opportunity to explore issues in depth.
In addition to the information we have received from the White House document productions and briefings, the Committee has analyzed the “Lessons Learned” report, which further details the White House’s involvement in – and shortcomings relating to – the response to Hurricane Katrina. The 125 specific recommendations in the report include several suggestions that recognize problems with the White House’s role before or following the catastrophe.
The Office of the Vice President, too, produced documents that have helped us piece together its role, and that of the White House, with respect to Hurricane Katrina. Among the more than 6,300 pages of documents produced are substantive emails, policy memos, and reports on the economic impact of Hurricane Katrina. Some of the emails were from David Addington, Counsel to the Vice President (and now Chief of Staff). The OVP also produced daily reports of the White House Hurricane Katrina Task Force and Homeland Security Council agendas.
Finally, the Committee has gained extraordinary insight into the White House role through the testimony and subsequent interview of former FEMA Director Michael Brown. In his February 10, 2006 testimony before the Committee and interview with Committee staff two weeks later, as well as through documents he produced directly to the Committee, Mr. Brown gave us a remarkably detailed view into the workings and deliberations of the White House during this critical period. As a result, the Committee has a well-developed picture of the White House’s interaction with the top federal official on the ground before and during the critical days after Katrina made landfall. As you point out, we know that, through Mr. Brown’s communications with Deputy White House Chief of Staff Joseph Hagin, the White House was aware the day of the storm of the devastation that New Orleans had suffered. And we know, from documents produced to us by Mr. Brown, that White House Chief of Staff Andy Card was aware of what Mr. Brown had told Mr. Hagin.
In your letter, you cite a February 9, 2006 memorandum prepared by the Congressional Research Service for our Committee to make the point that Congress has broad power to obtain documents and information from the Executive Office of the President. The memorandum goes on, though, to point out that, for Congress to “overcome” the executive privilege, it must make “a showing of need and unavailability of the information elsewhere.” It also suggests that one test of whether such “need and unavailability” exists is whether the Committee can put the various pieces of information we have obtained “together to create a coherent picture of what occurred, and why, in order to develop an informed legislative response.”
I believe that we have assembled a coherent picture of what occurred and that, together, we will develop an informed legislative response.
Sincerely,
Susan M. Collins
Chairman