WASHINGTON, D.C.—Senator Susan Collins accepted an award today from the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) in honor of her selection as their “Port Person of the Year” for 2006. The AAPA represents over 150 public ports throughout the United States, Canada and Latin American, and this year honored Senator Collins for her outstanding commitment to improving the security of our seaports and working to afford them with the resources needed to reach this goal.
The text of Senator Collins’ acceptance speech is provided below:
Thank you, Bernie. Thank you all for this very great honor. This award – what it stands for and who it’s from – means a great deal to me. I am very proud to be included with those outstanding leaders you have honored in the past, such as my colleague and partner on port security legislation, Senator Patty Murray.
It is a real pleasure to see so many familiar faces here today, people I have worked closely with over the years. People like Captain Jeff Monroe, Director of Ports and Transportation for the City of Portland in my home state. The knowledge and dedication he, and so many others here, bring to maritime issues are great assets to me in my work in the Senate. I accept this award with deep gratitude for all who have made it possible.
Coming from a maritime state, I know the importance of the ferries that bind communities together, the cruise ships that support our tourism industry, and the cargo ships that drive our economy.
I would like to focus my remarks today on an issue that is of paramount importance to me, and to this outstanding organization: the security of our nation’s seaports. In preparing for this event, it occurred to me that, rather than give a speech, I could just hand out copies of the op-eds, columns, and Congressional testimony by Bernie and your president, Kurt Nagle, that describe this issue so effectively. We truly are on the same page.
The announcements on the Dubai Ports World deal caused much heated debate in Congress and throughout the country. The silver lining of this controversy is that it has forced much-needed attention to the issue of port security. There are now more members of Congress than ever before joining those of us who have long argued that our ports are a major vulnerability in our homeland security.
The urgency cannot be overstated. Approximately 95 percent of our nation’s trade, worth nearly $1 trillion, enters or leaves through our 361 seaports. Our ports receive more than 8,500 foreign vessels, which make more than 55,000 calls per year. These ships carry the bulk of the approximately 800 million tons of goods that came into our country, including more than nine million containers and 175 billion gallons of oil and other fuels.
Al Qaeda has a stated goal of causing maximum harm to the American people and maximum damage to the American economy. Clearly, our cargo ports provide a tempting target. One has only to visit a major port like Seattle with its large urban population, two stadiums nearby, and daily ferries with thousands of passengers to realize the enormous loss of life that could occur if a dirty bomb were detonated.
We already have had a glimpse of the staggering economic damage a terrorist attack on a cargo port could produce, damage that would extend far beyond the waterfront. The West Coast dock strike in the fall of 2002 cost our economy and estimated $1 billion for each of the ten days it lasted. It not only brought those ports to a halt, but also harmed businesses throughout this country and along the entire length of the supply chain. And that astonishing amount of harm was the result of an event that was both peaceful and anticipated. A terrorist attack would be neither.
Just as the attacks of 9/11 grounded all commercial flights, an attack on one port would likely result in the closure of all ports for a time. And the federal government has yet to establish protocols for resuming port operations and for deciding which cargo would be release first after an attack. The impact on factories and retailers using “just-in-time” inventory, as many businesses do, would be devastating. Much of our agricultural sector would also be harmed as farmers would be unable to export their crops.
In addition to the threat of a direct attack on any port, any one of the more than nine million containers that enter the United States each year has the potential to be the Trojan horse of the 21st Century. A container usually contains consumer goods like TV sets, sneakers, or toys. But it could contain terrorists, biological agents, or even a nuclear weapon.
For years, criminals have used cargo containers to smuggle narcotics, firearms, and people into the United States. These containers may come from any one a thousand ports overseas, with varying levels of security. They also could be intercepted or tampered with along the way by those who seek to do us harm.
Here is an example of this vulnerability. Last year at about this time, I toured the ports of Los Angeles/Long Beach. The physical size of these facilities and the amount of activity that takes place are startling. So, too, are the opportunities they offer for terrorists to exploit.
By coincidence, my visit came just days before 32 Chinese nationals were smuggled into the Port of Los Angeles in two cargo containers. Fortunately, the Trojan horse held people seeking a better way of life, and not terrorists seeking to destroy our way of life. They were caught. What is particularly disturbing about that case is that they were not caught by any security initiative or new program, but rather by an alert crane operator. We cannot continue to rely on luck, or even alert crane operators, to provide for the security of our seaports, our nation, and our people.
The vulnerability is clear. In fact, the report of the 9/11 Commission states that, while commercial aviation remains a possible target, the opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime transportation. Other experts warn that a weapon of mass destruction is most likely to be smuggled into our country via our cargo ports.
Despite the acknowledged vulnerability of our ports, we have continually underfunded port security. Further complicating the issue, the Administration has again proposed the consolidation of all transportation and critical infrastructure grants into one program, the Targeted Infrastructure Protection Program (TIPP). I oppose this proposal because I believe that a dedicated funding stream is essential to addressing port security needs.
Last week, I was successful in offering an amendment to the 2007 Budget resolution to ensure no less than $300 million in dedicated funding for port security grants. These additional funds would be directed to three essential purposes: providing port security grants; purchasing additional non-intrusive inspection equipment; and increasing the rate of validation of C-TPAT participants. The Senate vote is encouraging, but the budget process has a long way to go. I can assure you that I will continue to advocate that port security is funded at an increased level
Last spring, I introduced the Port Security Grants Act. At $400 million per year for five years, this legislation would provide a steady stream of funding as a substantial down payment on port security needs. This competitive grant program would give individual ports the flexibility they need to address local conditions. Strong accountability provisions would prevent wasteful spending. These port security dollars would originate from duties collected by Customs and Border Protection. This is a major commitment of resources, but it is fully proportional to what is at stake
A fundamental goal of port security must be to head off trouble before it reaches our shores. Current supply-chain security programs within the Federal government, however, have been separately conceived and managed by different agencies, rather than woven together into a layered, consistent approach. These cargo security programs, while well conceived, have been flawed in their implementation.
The Container Security Program (CSI), in which Customs negotiates agreements with the governments of our trading partners to establish standards for container inspection and security, is a good concept. But government investigations have determined that the CSI program has been of questionable effectiveness due to inadequate staffing and equipment.
For example, the Government Accountability Office reported earlier this year that only 17.5 percent of the high-risk cargo identified by Customs and Border Protection was inspected overseas under CSI. The rest, despite being targeted for inspection, was simply loaded on cargo ships and sent to our shores.
We cannot eliminate the risk of terrorist attack, but better supply-chain security can build a stronger shield against terrorism without hampering trade. Indeed, greater security can promote trade and strengthen the global economy by building confidence and trust.
Late last year, Senator Patty Murray and I joined forces on legislation to strengthen this shield as we expedite trade. The GreenLane Maritime Cargo Security Act was developed in close consultation with key stakeholders including port authorities, major retailers and importers, carriers, supply chain managers, security and transportation experts, and Federal and state agencies. Many of you in this room today provided advice and feedback on our bill. I thank you for your efforts.
First, the bill directs the Department of Homeland Security to develop a strategic plan to strengthen security for all modes of transportation by which containers arrive in, depart from or move through seaports of the United States. This plan would clarify the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of government agencies at all levels and of private sector stakeholders. It would establish clear, measurable goals for furthering the security of commercial operations from point of origin to point of destination. It would establish mandatory, baseline security standards and provide incentives for additional voluntary measures.
Second, the bill would create a new Office of Cargo Security Policy to ensure implementation of the strategic plan. This small but important office would better coordinate maritime security efforts within the Department of Homeland Security and among our international and private-sector partners.
Third, my legislation requires the Department to make faster progress in strengthening port security. I am deeply concerned by the slow pace of the Department’s agenda. For example, the Department has been working on a regulation setting a minimum standard for mechanical seals on containers for more than two years. The Transportation workers Identification Card has languished for four years despite the obvious importance of a secure ID to controlling access to our ports.
Such delays are unacceptable. This legislation would set clear timelines to ensure steady progress. It gives the Department six months to establish minimum standards and procedures for securing containers in transit to the U.S. All containers bound for U.S. ports of entry must meet those standards no later than two years after they are established.
Fourth, my legislation requires that 100 percent of incoming containers be examined for radiation no later than one year after enactment. The Department has pledged to deploy radiation detection equipment at all ports of origin in the U.S. to examine cargo. The zero tolerance policy for radiation has been discussed since 2002. As of last month, however, less than a quarter of the detection equipment necessary for domestic coverage has been deployed. Even more frustrating is that the Department has changed the target for system deployment multiple times.
Fifth, my legislation also will provide the ongoing, predictable funding to support container security programs. For the first time, programs like the Container Security Initiative and C-TPAT will receive steady funding and clear guidance.
Supply-chain security requires a partnership among the Federal government, state, local, and overseas governments, and the private sector. This requires substantial investment of time, effort, and money by our partners. Yet, to date, the Federal investment in supply-chain security has been haphazard, unpredictable from year to year. You in the private sector cannot be expected to make these long-term investments without knowing that your Federal partners will follow through.
Some of you may be wondering about the name of this legislation – GreenLane. This would be a new, third tier of C-TPAT, which offers additional benefits to participants that voluntarily meet the highest level of security standards. Cargo in transit to the U.S. through the GreenLane would be more secure through the use of container security devices and stronger supply chain security practices. The additional benefits may include further reduced inspections, priority processing for inspections, and, most important, preference in entering U.S. ports in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. This incentive-based approach works with the business community.
Finally, this comprehensive legislation also includes the port security grants which I have introduced as a separate bill as well. I will continue to fight for this and additional funding.
America’s seaports, large and small, are on the front lines of the war against terrorism, and they are vital to our economy at all levels. As Bernie put it in a recent Washington Times op-ed, “Secure and efficient ports play a critical role in the seamless, invisible, reliable movement of goods on which our country and its consumers depend every day.
We cannot take this seamless, invisible reliability for granted. We cannot eliminate the risk of terrorist attack, but we can build a stronger shield against terrorism without hampering trade or travel. Port security is now a high-profile issue. With your continued support, I believe that we can pass this important legislation this year.
Again, I thank you all for the opportunity to join you today, and for this great honor.
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