Securing Our Nation’s Mass Transit Systems

On the morning of July 7th, terrorists exploded three bombs on underground trains in central London. A fourth bomb destroyed a double-decker bus. Fifty-two innocent people were murdered in those attacks. More than 700 were injured.

Exactly two weeks later, on July 21st, another attack was launched during London's morning rush hour. Again, three trains and a bus were the targets. Fortunately, those bombs failed to detonate.

The attacks on London have been described as a "wake-up call" to those responsible for the safety and security of our own mass transit systems. And they are not the first. They echo the alarms set off by earlier attacks on mass transit in Madrid, Moscow, Tokyo, Tel Aviv, and so many other cities around the world. In fact, the National Counterterrorism Center database reveals that, in 2004, there were more than 150 deadly terrorist attacks on mass transit worldwide.

I recently chaired a hearing of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee where we examined the security of mass transit systems in the United States and considered what additional measures may be called for. We heard testimony from officials at the Department of Homeland Security, the London Underground, Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, and New Age Security Solutions.

We discussed the inherent openness of mass transit as a challenge to incorporating security. In the jargon of counterterrorism, we often speak of "soft targets." Soft targets are those locations and facilities that attract large numbers of people and that, by their very nature, must be open to easy public access, such as schools, shopping malls, hotels, restaurants, and sports arenas. The American mass transit system is among the softest of these targets.

Every year, according to the American Public Transportation Association, Americans take more than 9.6 billion trips on public transportation. Every weekday, approximately 6,000 public transit systems carry more than 14 million passengers. This means that in less than a month's time, transit systems move more passengers than U.S. airlines transport in a year.

Implementing security measures for these necessarily open systems is a responsibility borne by federal, state, and local government officials as well as private sector owners and operators. Meeting this challenge requires a strategic vision and short- and long-term action plans, developed among those parties. And it requires the federal government's leadership.

I question whether the Department is focused too narrowly on aviation security to the detriment of other modes of transportation. While it is understandable that after the 9/11 attacks, air security would command our immediate focus, I believe it is time to reassess priorities and evaluate our preparedness across all modes of transportation.

The answer, of course, is not merely to invest more in mass transit security, but to invest it wisely, to adopt and expand the strategies and tools that have proved successful elsewhere. From communications, surveillance equipment, sensors, and access control systems to planning, training, additional transit police and increased public awareness, the techniques by which mass transit security can be improved are known and in use. It is time we employ these techniques more widely to harden a target that remains far too soft.

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