Keeping The Watchdog On The Job
One of the best examples of thorough and effective government oversight
can be found at the office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction, or “SIGIR.” This office is tasked with auditing and
investigating billions of dollars used for Iraq reconstruction projects,
including government contacts. Led by Stuart Bowen, the SIGIR’s office has
proven to be an effective and much-needed watchdog.
I worked with my Senate colleague Russ Feingold to create the SIGIR’s
office in 2003. Since then, I have met numerous times with Stuart Bowen to
review the work being done by his office. His work has been aggressive,
impressive, and crucial.
The Special IG’s office is credited with saving the American taxpayer
millions of dollars through audits. It has exposed numerous cases of waste,
fraud, and abuse, including the uncompleted project of the Basrah Children’s
Hospital. SIGIR investigators recently discovered that the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) used an accounting shell game to hide
ballooning construction costs – from $50 million to an estimated $170 million
– and schedule delays of more than 567 days for the hospital.
Despite the millions of dollars that have been spent on the project, this
hospital, which would help meet a critical need of Iraqi children, has yet to
open.
In another significant case, the SIGIR’s office found that a $94 million
construction project for student barracks at the Baghdad Police College had
such major construction deficiencies that wastewater was being pumped into the
building posing an environmental and health risk to students, instructors, and
workers. The building also was in danger of collapsing.
In total, the SIGIR’s office is responsible for oversight of
approximately $32 billion in Iraq reconstruction contracts and grants. In its
latest quarterly report, the agency reported 92 open investigations in Iraq,
73 audit reports, and 65 project assessments. The office’s work has resulted
in the arrest of five people and the convictions of four for misusing taxpayer
funds, with more than $17 million in assets seized. As a result of this work,
the Inspector General estimates that the financial impact of these audits,
investigations, and inspections is approximately $1.87 billion, far exceeding
the office’s expenses of $72 million. That means the office provides the
American taxpayer a benefit of more than $25 for every dollar it has spent on
oversight and investigations.
With a track record of aggressive oversight and successful efforts in
saving the American taxpayer millions of dollars, it is inconceivable that
Congress would remove the ability of the Inspector General to continue his
important work. Yet, that is exactly what happened in a recently enacted
defense authorization bill.
This legislation included a provision that would sunset the Special IG’s
office, essentially eliminating the office on October 1, 2007. At a time when
we are still spending billions of dollars on Iraqi reconstruction efforts, it
is critical that the Special IG continue his aggressive oversight.
That is why I joined again with Senator Feingold in an effort to remove
this sunset date and extend the term of this critical office so that it can
continue to protect American taxpayers. . Senator Feingold and I introduced
the Iraq Reconstruction Accountability Act and were joined by a bipartisan
group of more than 20 of our colleagues. I am pleased that our proposal was
approved by a unanimous vote in the Senate as part of the Military
Construction Appropriations Bill.
The Iraq Reconstruction Accountability Act restores the SIGIR’s
termination date to its previous schedule of 10 months after 80-percent of
Iraq reconstruction funds have been expended. Based on current expenditure
estimates, we expect the Special IG’s office to remain operational until late
2008.
Effective oversight of Iraq reconstruction requires the unique approach
provided by the SIGIR. Special IG Stuart Bowen described this approach when
he testified in August at a hearing that I chaired of the Senate Homeland
Security Committee. He explained that the SIGIR’s auditors and inspectors
provide on-the-spot guidance to managers as soon as problems are discovered,
so corrective action can begin immediately. This “real time” method allows
most of their reports to document not only how problems were detected, but
also how they should be corrected. This method works. It should continue as
long as American funds are being used for Iraq reconstruction.
There is no question that SIGIR has proven itself to be a much-needed
watchdog, auditing reconstruction contracts in Iraq and spotlighting numerous
cases of waste, fraud, and abuse. We must keep this watchdog on the job.
can be found at the office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction, or “SIGIR.” This office is tasked with auditing and
investigating billions of dollars used for Iraq reconstruction projects,
including government contacts. Led by Stuart Bowen, the SIGIR’s office has
proven to be an effective and much-needed watchdog.
I worked with my Senate colleague Russ Feingold to create the SIGIR’s
office in 2003. Since then, I have met numerous times with Stuart Bowen to
review the work being done by his office. His work has been aggressive,
impressive, and crucial.
The Special IG’s office is credited with saving the American taxpayer
millions of dollars through audits. It has exposed numerous cases of waste,
fraud, and abuse, including the uncompleted project of the Basrah Children’s
Hospital. SIGIR investigators recently discovered that the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) used an accounting shell game to hide
ballooning construction costs – from $50 million to an estimated $170 million
– and schedule delays of more than 567 days for the hospital.
Despite the millions of dollars that have been spent on the project, this
hospital, which would help meet a critical need of Iraqi children, has yet to
open.
In another significant case, the SIGIR’s office found that a $94 million
construction project for student barracks at the Baghdad Police College had
such major construction deficiencies that wastewater was being pumped into the
building posing an environmental and health risk to students, instructors, and
workers. The building also was in danger of collapsing.
In total, the SIGIR’s office is responsible for oversight of
approximately $32 billion in Iraq reconstruction contracts and grants. In its
latest quarterly report, the agency reported 92 open investigations in Iraq,
73 audit reports, and 65 project assessments. The office’s work has resulted
in the arrest of five people and the convictions of four for misusing taxpayer
funds, with more than $17 million in assets seized. As a result of this work,
the Inspector General estimates that the financial impact of these audits,
investigations, and inspections is approximately $1.87 billion, far exceeding
the office’s expenses of $72 million. That means the office provides the
American taxpayer a benefit of more than $25 for every dollar it has spent on
oversight and investigations.
With a track record of aggressive oversight and successful efforts in
saving the American taxpayer millions of dollars, it is inconceivable that
Congress would remove the ability of the Inspector General to continue his
important work. Yet, that is exactly what happened in a recently enacted
defense authorization bill.
This legislation included a provision that would sunset the Special IG’s
office, essentially eliminating the office on October 1, 2007. At a time when
we are still spending billions of dollars on Iraqi reconstruction efforts, it
is critical that the Special IG continue his aggressive oversight.
That is why I joined again with Senator Feingold in an effort to remove
this sunset date and extend the term of this critical office so that it can
continue to protect American taxpayers. . Senator Feingold and I introduced
the Iraq Reconstruction Accountability Act and were joined by a bipartisan
group of more than 20 of our colleagues. I am pleased that our proposal was
approved by a unanimous vote in the Senate as part of the Military
Construction Appropriations Bill.
The Iraq Reconstruction Accountability Act restores the SIGIR’s
termination date to its previous schedule of 10 months after 80-percent of
Iraq reconstruction funds have been expended. Based on current expenditure
estimates, we expect the Special IG’s office to remain operational until late
2008.
Effective oversight of Iraq reconstruction requires the unique approach
provided by the SIGIR. Special IG Stuart Bowen described this approach when
he testified in August at a hearing that I chaired of the Senate Homeland
Security Committee. He explained that the SIGIR’s auditors and inspectors
provide on-the-spot guidance to managers as soon as problems are discovered,
so corrective action can begin immediately. This “real time” method allows
most of their reports to document not only how problems were detected, but
also how they should be corrected. This method works. It should continue as
long as American funds are being used for Iraq reconstruction.
There is no question that SIGIR has proven itself to be a much-needed
watchdog, auditing reconstruction contracts in Iraq and spotlighting numerous
cases of waste, fraud, and abuse. We must keep this watchdog on the job.
